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Reframing Roe:
Property over Privacy*
Rebecca L. Rauscht
ABSTRACT

Roe v. Wade has received much criticism from both sides of the political
spectrum. These critiques diverge divisively but for one commonality.
Specifically, commentators from both the pro- and anti-choice camps have
expressed concern about the absence of an express constitutional right to
privacy, upon which the Supreme Court in Roe based its finding of a
"fundamental" right to abortion. This lack of express constitutional provision
renders the Roe decision, and its resulting reproductive rights, vulnerable.
Further, pro-choice advocates find fault with the privacy basis because it yields
no positive rights to funding or governmental support for accessing abortion
services. When based upon a right to privacy, the right to abortion is relegated to
the land of negative rights. The negative right to privacy might provide some
women with reproductive choice free from government intrusion, but for other
women-those with limited resources-the so-called "choice" becomes
nonexistent.
This article investigates whether these two shortcomings-the absence of
positive rights and the lack of express constitutional language-inherent in the
right to privacy might be redressed by refraining Roe in the language of property,
and specifically a woman's property right in her uterus. Assuming arguendo the
anti-choice tenet that the fetus is a person from the moment of conception, this
article sets forth an argument that the fetus is an unwanted trespasser in the
woman's uterus whom the woman has a right to eject. Further, this article posits
that this property-based notion of abortion might justify government funding for
abortions based on a constitutional obligation to maintain a system designed to
protect women's uterine property, similar to states' obligations to maintain a
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REFRAMING ROE

police force in order to protect other forms of private property, including the
removal of trespassers. In short, this article provides a new basis for abortion
rights that takes advantage of the long-standing traditional notions of property
law and the right to exclude, as well as the public support that attaches to that
right, manifested through anti-trespass systems. After establishing the propertybased argument, the article explores what might be gained, and what might be
lost, by adopting such a premise for abortion rights and access. Among these
considerations is whether the anti-trespass scheme might push the abortion
discourse beyond the typical polarizing rhetoric surrounding both the pro-choice
and anti-choice camps, thus generating space for forward movement and
meaningful work.
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INTRODUCTION

[A]n owner suffers a special kind of injury when a stranger directly invades
and occupies the owner's property . .. [P]roperty law has long protected an
owner's expectation that [s]he will be relatively undisturbed at least in the
possession of [her] property. To require, as well, that the owner permit another
to exercise complete dominion literally adds insult to injury.

[P]regnancy is a dangerous, psychically consuming, existentially intrusive, and
physically invasive assault upon the body which in turn leads to a dangerous,
consuming, intrusive, invasive assault on the mother's self-identity-that best
captures women's own sense of the injury and danger of pregnancy ...2
This article addresses a potential intersection of pregnancy and property in
the context of reproductive rights. For a woman who is pregnant against her
wishes, 3 the fetus is a stranger-a foreign entity in her body who, as far as she is
1. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982) (citing Frank I.
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundationsof "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1128, and n. 110 (1967)).
2. Robin West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 30 (1988).
3. A woman might be pregnant against her wishes in a number of different ways, such as rape,
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concerned, should not be there. If she is a woman of financial means over the age
of eighteen living in the United States, then at least at this point in history, she
can probably secure an abortion.4 If not, likely she is stuck in the "dangerous,
psychically consuming, existentially intrusive, and physically invasive" 5 state of
pregnancy until such time as nature decides the fetus is ready to emerge.
Abortion proponents and opponents alike have criticized the Court's
decision in Roe v. Wade. Both sides of the political spectrum specifically critique
the lack of an express constitutional right to privacy, 7 on which the Supreme
Court in Roe based its decision to find a "fundamental" 8 right to abortion.9
Indeed, the doctrine of privacy law has a relatively short history, originating not
in the Constitution, or even in Supreme Court jurisprudence, but in a law review
article written by Justice Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren in the late
nineteenth century.' 0 This lack of constitutional context and legal history renders

4.
5.
6.

birth control failure, and a post-pregnancy change of circumstances. Each of these situations
is addressed herein.
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
West, supra note 2, at 30.
Stanley K. Henshaw & Lawrence B. Finer, The Accessibility of Abortion Services In the
United States, 2001, 35 PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 16, 19-20,

8.

23 (Jan./Feb. 2003). See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding the Hyde
Amendment prohibition on federal funding for abortions). For an explanation of the Court's
decision in Harris,see infra note 215.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 ("The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In
a line of decisions, however ... the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or
a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution . . . These
decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' . . . are included in this guarantee of personal
privacy.")
Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.

9.

See, e.g., EILEEN MCDONAGH, BREAKING THE ABORTION DEADLOCK: FROM CHOICE TO

7.

CONSENT 107 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special
Reference to Pornography,Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 31 (1992);
Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-ConstitutionalizingAbortion Rights,
118 YALE L. J. 1394, 1419-20 (2009).
10. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
Warren and Brandeis explored the development of the right to be let alone in light of existing
constitutional rights of life, liberty, and property, with a particular focus on the latter. Using
examples of injunctions against publication of private writings, they concluded that "[t]he
principle which protects personal writing and all other personal productions, not against theft
and physical appropriation, but against publication in any form, is in reality not the principle
of private property, but that of an inviolate personality." Id. at 205 (internal marks and
citations omitted). Warren and Brandeis also examined various cases involving certain tort
and contract theories, but ultimately determined
that the rights, so protected, whatever their exact nature, are not rights arising from
contract or from special trust, but are rights as against the world; and, as above
stated, the principle which has been applied to protect these rights is in reality not
the principle of private property, unless that work be used in an extended and
unusual sense. The principle which protects personal writings and any other
productions of the intellect or of the emotions, is the right to privacy, and the law
has no new principle to formulate when it extends this protection to the personal
appearance, sayings, acts, and to personal relation, domestic or otherwise.
Id. at 213.
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the opinion vulnerable to judicial chipping away at the underlying right and
potential full reversal." Further, as pro-choice advocates have critiqued, the right
to privacy yields no positive rights to funding or access support from the
government; it is relegated to the land of negative rights, which might provide
the right woman with reproductive choice free from government intrusion, but
for the wrong woman-one with limited resources-the so-called "choice"
becomes nonexistent.12
This article endeavors to address both of these critiques by refraining Roe
as a property right in the uterus rather than a right to privacy. In an attempt to
avoid one of the most basic controversies between the two political camps, the
article assumes as true the pro-life tenet that the fetus is a person from the
moment of conception.' 3 Property rights pre-date the existence of this country,' 4
and the legal language and analyses stemming from that longevity provide a
vehicle for securing abortion rights more solidly grounded than privacy doctrine.
Additionally, property ownership carries certain rights to state protection.
"Governmental enforcement of trespass laws . .. is frequently thought simply to
ratify existing distributions [of property]. Rather than interfering with them, legal
enforcement of property . . . rights is built into and indistinguishable from

existing distributions."' 5 To the extent a woman has property rights in her uterus,
as this article posits, the distribution of those rights to the woman necessarily
pre-exists pregnancy, for the uterus has been in a pregnant woman's body long
before any fertilized embryo might nestle into the uterine wall. Accordingly, a
woman's right to exclude from her uterine property, manifested through antitrespass laws, provides an alternate basis for abortion rights that carries
government support. In short, this article provides a different basis for abortion
rights that takes advantage of the long-standing traditional notions of property
doctrine, and specifically the right to exclude, as well as the government support
that attaches to that right manifested through anti-trespass law.
While this piece offers a viable legal argument for creating uterine property
and securing government support for the protection thereof, its goal is not to
advocate for adopting that uterine property framework. Rather, the article
challenges readers to think about what would be gained, and lost, if uterine
property existed. In short, this is a thought piece, designed to provide a new
vision of an old problem. Part I provides an overview of other pro-choice efforts
to secure alternate bases for abortion rights and briefly shows how such efforts
have failed. Part II serves as a primer for the basic tenets of property law

11.
12.

See, e.g., McDONAGH, supra note 9, at 3.
Id. at 3-5.

13.

See, e.g., MCDONAGH, supra note 9, at 6 (assuming that the fetus is a private party for
purposes of making a pro-choice argument); Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion,
I PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 48 (1971) (same).
See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 10, at 193 ("That the individual shall have full protection
in person and in property is a principle as old as the common law").
Sunstein, supra note 9, at 7.

14.
15.
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necessary to the analyses set forth in Part III, which locates a property right in a
woman's uterus, and Part IV, which attaches the right to exclude and
government support of that right to a woman's uterine property, through the lens
of trespass. Part V examines how a uterine property right and an abortion
entitlement based on that right might be realized given the existing legal
landscape. With the trespass-based argument set forth, Part VI explores some
potential benefits and drawbacks of implementing such an argument for securing
abortion rights and access, paying particular attention to how uterine property
might impact the fragmented "storm center" 16 Roe generated. The persistent
polarization between the pro- and anti-choice movements precludes further
meaningful work on reproductive justice. 17 "[B]oth pro-choice and pro-life
arguments are locked into rhetoric and strategies that fail to situate the struggle
within the broader context of reproductive control."' 8 Property-based abortion
rights might push the discourse out of stagnancy, potentially yielding revitalized
respect for autonomous decision-making.
I.

OTHER PRO-CHOICE BASES FOR REFRAMING ROE

Several scholars have penned alternate visions of abortion rights, rejecting
the privacy framework espoused in Roe v. Wade. Some scholars posit that the
appropriate branch of government to tackle this issue is the legislature, not the
judiciary. Others think abortion rights should rest on equal protection doctrine,
rather than the right to privacy read into the liberty component of the Due
Process Clause. As described in this Part, however, both of these ideas have
failed in some distinct way.
Robin West, for example, believes that Roe was wrongly decided not
because of the constitutional analysis, but because there should have been no
analysis at all. Professor West asserts that the abortion decision should be left to
the legislatures.19 She contends that legislative efforts might be better able to
secure real access to abortions through government funding 20 and that legislation
need not be as movement-limiting as Roe has been, constrained by stare decisis
and the concept of negative rights.21 Further, legislative efforts to guarantee
16.

Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v.
Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 376 (1985).

17.

GENE BURNS, THE MORAL VETO: FRAMING CONTRACEPTION, ABORTION, AND CULTURAL
PLURALISM IN THE UNITED STATES 2-7 (2009).
SUSAN BORDO, UNBEARABLE WEIGHT: FEMINISM, WESTERN CULTURE, AND THE BODY 71

18.

(1993).
See West, supra note 9, at 1396-97; see also Robin West, Concurring, in WHAT ROE V.
WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID 121-47 (Jack M. Balkin, ed., NYU Press 2005). From the antiabortion camp, Jeffrey Rosen shares in this belief. See Jeffrey Rosen, Dissenting, in WHAT
ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID 170-86 (Jack M. Balkin, ed., NYU Press 2005). Notably,
though, many state legislatures stalled on liberalized abortion laws prior to Roe, so perhaps
the legislative branch is not the best choice to address this problem. See BURNS, supra note
17, at 207-20.
20. West, supra note 9, at 1404.
21. Id. at 1431.
19.
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abortion rights might open the pro-choice movement's eyes to new opportunities
for coalition-building, or at minimum, breaking the "logjam" in the current
debate. 22 Unfortunately, no legislative efforts on either side of the debate have
achieved success, perhaps because it may be political suicide to step into the
abortion ring.
A more popular alternative basis for abortion rights, advanced by
numerous scholars, advocates for reframing abortion rights in equal protection
rather than privacy doctrine. 24 Cass Sunstein posits that an equal protection
framework "sees a prohibition on abortion as invalid because it involves a
cooptation of women's bodies for the protection of fetuses" 25 and "[n]o parallel
[cooptation] is imposed on men." 26 His equal protection argument proceeds on
four grounds, namely, that anti-abortion laws: (1) facially discriminate on the
basis of sex; (2) are impermissibly selective of women; (3) result from social
gender stereotypes that cannot be maintained under the Constitution; and (4) fail
27
to achieve the stated legislative purpose of protecting fetal lives.
Professor Sunstein asserts that the female anatomy and its capacity to bear
children do not necessitate the systemic conclusion that women should be
compelled to do so by virtue of statutory law.28 In other words, "the role of
motherhood for women should be chosen rather than given." 29 Further, he
believes that an equal protection argument "does not and need not take a position
on the status of the fetus. It acknowledges the possibility that fetuses are in
important respects human beings . . . . But it asserts that . . . the government

cannot impose on women alone the obligation to protect fetuses through a legal
act of bodily cooptation." 3o According to Professor Sunstein, "[e]ven if the fetus

22. Id. at 1431-32.
23. Cf BURNS, supra note 17, at 22-23 ("Contestation over the legal status of something like
contraception or abortion results in somewhat of a legislative freeze: Even if the legal
situation does not draw much positive support, it is generally easier for legislators to leave in
place the status quo. This can be true even when no one in particular is passionately in favor
of the status quo. As we shall see in the history of battles over contraception and abortion,
legislators would rather avoid dealing with an issue involving moral polarization, even if the
group(s) exercising a moral veto are a definite minority.").
24. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW 93-102 (1987); MCDONAGH, supra note 9, at 125-54 (1996); Jack M. Balkin, Opinion
of the Court, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID 31-57 (Jack M. Balkin, ed., NYU
Press 2005); Guido Calabresi, Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional
Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80, 146-49
(1991); Ginsburg, supra note 16; Frances Olsen, Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 105, 117-35 (1989); Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV.
1569, 1621-45 (1979); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on
Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992);
Sunstein, supra note 9, at 31-44.
25. Sunstein, supra note 9, at 31 (citing Regan, supra note 24; Thomson, supra note 13).
26. Id at 31-32.
27. Id at 32.
28. Id. at 33, 40.
29. Id. at 33.

30. Id. at 32.
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has all of the status of human life, the bodies of women cannot, under current
circumstances, be conscripted in order to protect it." 3 ' The abortion exceptions
32
for survivors of rape and incest, he suggests, lend support to this conclusion.
Stated otherwise, many anti-abortion statutes contain exceptions for instances of
rape and incest, 33 meaning that at least in these two circumstances, a woman may
not be forced to carry the pregnancy to term, even if "life" began at the moment
of conception. The woman's decision about what to do with her body trumps any
interest in fetal life.
Reva Siegel, another advocate of the equal protection vehicle for securing
abortion rights, offers a position similar to that of Professor Sunstein. Professor
Siegel contends that anti-abortion statutes arise, not necessarily from a state
interest in the life of the unborn, but instead and more prominently from
traditional notions of gender roles and women's necessary and inherent work as
mothers.34 She traces these stereotypes back to the nineteenth century
movement, fostered by medical professionals, to criminalize abortion "to ensure
women's performance of marital and maternal obligations and to preserve the
ethnic character of the nation."35 These physicians spoke about abortion in their
own taxonomy, focusing the debate in medical discourse and utilizing
physiology to show that women, by biological necessity, must carry pregnancies
to term to ensure the continuation of humanity.36 Thus, the argument supporting
the criminalization of abortion rested on the biological "consequences of a
woman's body-not practices of the community that would regulate her
conduct."3 Following suit, in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court essentially
"present[ed] the burdens of motherhood as woman's destiny and dilemma-a
condition for which no other social actor bears responsibility."38
This "physiological naturalism" 39 intrinsically relegates the abortion debate
to a discourse on sex rather than gender, and the focus on the former distracts

31.

Id. at 40.

32.

Id. at 40-41.

33.

See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-705 (2011); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-101(1)(b)
(2011); DEL. C. TIT. 24, § 1790(a)(3); IDAHO CODE § 18-608(1) (2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
30-5-1(C), 30-5-3 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-302(3)(b)(iii).

34.

Siegel, supra note 24.

35.
36.

Id. at 279.
Id.

37. Id. at 274. See also then-Professor Ginsburg's analysis on the equality reasoning in Roe.
Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 382-83 (quoting Karst, Foreword:Equal Citizenship Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1, 57 (1977)) ("It is not a sufficient answer to

charge it all to women's anatomy-a natural, not man-made, phenomenon. Society, not
anatomy, "places a greater stigma on unmarried women who become pregnant than on the
men who father their children." [ ] Society expects, but nature does not command, that
"women take the major responsibility... for child care" [ ] and that they will stay with their
children, bearing nurture and support burdens alone, when fathers deny paternity or
otherwise refuse to provide care or financial support for unwanted offspring.").
38. Siegel, supra note 24, at 274.
39. Id at 265.
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from the possibility of focusing on the latter. 40 Attention to women's
reproductive organs comes at the expense of attention to the systemic ways in
which women are gendered as mothers through social expectation. So long as
medical supremacy and physiological naturalism persist, Professor Siegel
contends, the Equal Protection Clause cannot provide a meaningful
constitutional critique of reproductive regulation.4 1 Once the Court removes the
medical lens from its jurisprudence and employs a more encompassing view of
gender and women's social roles, however, she posits that equal protection can
and should serve as an appropriate basis for striking down anti-abortion statutes
as unconstitutional, given the facially discriminatory nature of the statutes,
whether implementing an antidiscrimination or an antisubordination
framework. 42 "Equal protection doctrine is the only body of constitutional
jurisprudence explicitly skeptical about the rationality of gender-based
judgments and specifically concerned with the justice of gender-based
,'43
impositions.
But while equal protection has the capacity to focus on gender, that
capacity does not provide much benefit for the abortion analysis. As Professor
Sunstein acknowledges, equal protection doctrine necessarily sets white men's
bodies, straight men's gender, and upper middle class men's social position as
the standard and measures all others, including women, against that norm.44 And
as Joan C. Williams indicates, so long as the goal continues to be achieving
parity with the status of men, history teaches that women will continue to run
45
into glass ceilings, maternal walls, and other obstacles that preclude success.
Property doctrine, on the other hand, need not set a male goal.
Further, an equal protection argument protecting abortion rights does not
secure positive rights to government support for accessing abortions, without
40. Id. at 264-77. Professor Siegel states,

41.
42.

[The] medical analysis displaces social analysis of the exercise of state power
entailed in restricting women's access to abortion. For this reason, the interest in
potential life recognized in Roe can be employed to justify fetal-protective
regulation of women in a fashion that is inattentive to the gender-based impact of
that regulation as well as to the possibility that it may be gender biased.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 272.
Id. at 347-81; see also Ginsburg,supra note 16, at 382 ("If Roe had left off at that point and

not adopted what Professor Freund called a 'medical approach,' physicians might have been
less pleased with the decision, but the legislative trend might have continued in the [liberal]

direction in which it was headed in the early 1970s.") (citations omitted).
43.

Siegel, supra note 24, at 352.

44. See Sunstein, supra note 9, at 43.
45.

See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, Beyond the Glass Ceiling: The Maternal Wall as a Barrierto
Gender Equality, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1 (2003); Joan C. Williams & Veta Richardson,
New Millennium, Same Glass Ceiling? The Impact of Law Firm Compensation Systems on
Women, 62 HASTINGs L.J. 597 (2011); Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the
Maternal Wall: Relieffor Family Caregivers Who are DiscriminatedAgainst on the Job, 26
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 77 (2003); Joan Williams, Toward a Reconstructive Feminism:
Reconstructingthe Relationship of Market Work and Family Work, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 89

(1998).
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somehow manipulating the Equal Protection Clause out of its negative rights
cloak and establishing poverty as a protected class.46 Conversely, Professor
Sunstein posits that private property rights "are uncontroversial, and properly so.
. . [and] fully positive. Their existence depends on the willingness of state
officials to enforce trespass laws. . ..
Finally, even if none of the above critiques are persuasive, the Supreme
Court has already foreclosed an equal protection argument in favor of abortion
rights, holding that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is not sex-based
discrimination, since all non-pregnant persons, including both men and women,
receive identical treatment. 4 8 Though Congress has indicated its disagreement
with the Court's holding by revising Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to
expressly include pregnancy as a basis for sex-based discrimination, such
revision "is not controlling in constitutional adjudication," and while hope could
persist that the revised Title VII "might stimulate the Court one day to revise its
position that regulation governing 'pregnant persons' is not sex-based," nothing
stronger than wishes exists.49 In addition, Title VII only applies in the
employment context,so which does not extend to securing abortion rights.
In sum, neither a legislative approach nor a judicial restructuring based on
equal protection doctrine suffices to address abortion rights in a way that
meaningfully alters the current status quo. The legislature is challenged by
politicking and the equal protection argument has been preempted. An argument
based on property rights, however, remains available and is not subject to
Congressional politicking or judicial curtailment, at least vis-A-vis the baseline,
fundamental right.
II. A PROPERTY PRIMER

Before turning attention to recognition of property-based protection
sufficient to support abortion rights and government funding to ensure access, a
brief primer in general property law is necessary. Property scholars continually
debate the definition of property, the nature of property rights, the origins of
those rights, and the protections available for those rights.5 1 It is beyond the
46. See Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 384-85; Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (quoting
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1977) (holding that poverty is not a suspect class)). But
cf Lawrence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative
Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REv. 330, 335-40 (1985) (offering an
argument that establishes positive rights to public funding for abortions, grounded in equal
protection).
47. Sunstein, supra note 9, at 9. Trespass laws are further examined in the abortion context infra
Section IV.
48. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n. 20 (1974); McDONAGH, supra note 9, at
131; Siegel, supra note 24, at 268-72.
49. Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 379.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (West 2010); see also Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v.
E.E.O.C., 462 U.S. 669, 676-82 (1983).
51. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L.
REv. 531, 531 (2005) ("[P]roperty law has eluded both a consistent definition and a unified
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purview of this article to espouse yet another theory of general property law or
recitation of its doctrinal development.52 Despite the variety of viewpoints and
theories in the litarature, a few basic premises have achieved consensus 53 or
otherwise dominate due to Supreme Court jurisprudence. These premises will
suffice here.
First, the predominant view of property is not necessarily concerned with
specific things, but rather with the rights that individuals assert in relation to
those things vis-i-vis other individuals and within the context of a society. 54
These property rights are commonly referred to as a "bundle of rights" or a
"bundle of sticks"55 -a conceptual view "so pervasive that even the dimmest law
student can be counted upon to parrot [it] on command."56 Crafted from the
works of Wesley Hohfeld, A.M. Honord, and other legal realists of the early
twentieth century, at this stage in the development of property law, even the
Supreme Court has adopted the bundle theory. Common property rights in the
theoretical bundle include the rights of acquisition, use, disposal, and
exclusion.59
Second, the most central right in the bundle is the right to exclude others
from the property at issue. 60 As the Supreme Court stated, "[t]he power to
conceptual framework. Indeed, modem property scholarship has utterly splintered the
field."); Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357 (1954);
James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of Property Rights, 95 CORNELL L.
REV. 139 (2009); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV.
730 (1998); Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ.
L. REV. 371, 372 (2003); Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception ofProperty: Cross
Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667 (1988) [hereinafter
Radin, Liberal Conception]; Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 957 (1982); 0. Lee Reed, What is "Property"?,41 AM. Bus. L. J.459 (2004); Laura S.
Underkuffler, When Should Rights "Trump"? An Examination of Speech and Property, 52
ME. L. REV. 311 (2000).
52. Indeed, providing yet another new theory of property, its history, its development, or its
future would subvert this article's purpose. As indicated herein, one of the main reasons to
implement a property analysis in support of abortion is to take advantage of its deep-rooted
existence in American jurisprudence.
53. Merrill, supra note 51, at 731-33.
54.

Id.

55. See, e.g., Reed, supra note 51, at 470-72.
56.

BRUCE ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 26 (1977), quoted in Bell

& Parchomovsky, supra note 51, at 546; accordJ.E. Penner, The "Bundle ofRights "Picture
ofProperty, 43 U.C.L.A. LAW REV. 711, 712 (1996); Denise R. Johnson, Reflections on the
Bundle ofRights, 32 VT. L. REV. 247, 247 (2007).
57. See, e.g., Bell and Parchomovsky, supra note 51, at 545- 46; Merrill, supra note 51, at 73738; Mossoff, supra note 51, at 372-75.
58. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987); Hodel v. Irving, 481
U.S. 704, 716-18 (1987); Loretto, 458 U.S. at 433-36 (1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979); see also Johnson, supra note 56, at 247 ("In recent years, an
academic debate has raged about whether the bundle of rights is a correct or useful way of
thinking about property rights. Whatever its faults or inadequacies, the bundle of rights is the

dominant legal paradigm for the courts and the theory of property that is taught to American
law students.").
59. See, e.g., Mossoff, supra note 51, at 376.
60. Cohen, supra note 51, at 370-71, 374 ("(L]et us put this down as one more point of
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exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in an
owner's bundle of property rights." 61 Whether the right to exclude is the sine qua
non of the rights bundle 6 2 or an "essential but insufficient component" thereof,63
the centrality of the right to exclude is well recognized.64 This centrality can be
6
traced back to James Madison and other Founders, 65 Native American tribes,66
William Blackstone, early modem rights theorists (such as Hugo Grotius,
Samuel Pufendorf, and John Locke),68 Aristotle, 6 9 and even to prehistoric
tribes.70
Third, the removal of any other right from the bundle does not necessarily
render the substance at issue non-property. ' For example, though the rights of
72
acquisition, use, and disposal are traditionally associated with property,

61.

agreement in our analysis of the meaning of private property. Private property may or may
not involve a right to use something oneself. It may or may not involve a right to sell, but
whatever else it involves, it must at least involve a right to exclude others from doing
something.").
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 (citations omitted). This premise aligns, at least facially, with the
libertarian argument of the "Robert Nozick variety" that personal property should be free
from interference by the government and other private actors. See, e.g., Peter Halewood, On
Commodification and Self-Ownership, 20 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 131, 135 (2008).

62.
63.
64.

Merrill, supra note 51, at 730.
Mossoff, supra note 51, at 377-79, 389-90.
Radin, Liberal Conception, supra note 51, at 1671-72; see Susan E. Looper-Friedman,
"Keep Your Laws Off My Body": Abortion Regulation and the Takings Clause, 29 NEW
ENG. L. REv. 253, 256 (1995); John William Nelson, The Virtual Property Problem: What
Property Rights in Virtual Resources Might Look Like, How They Might Work, and Why
They Are a Bad Idea, 41 McGEORGE L. REV. 281, 295 (2010); Reed, supra note 51, at 473

("[I]t is possible to define property as a single negative right, the right of exclusion as applied
to limited resources. Property is the constitutional and legal right to exclude othersincluding the state-from specifiable limited resources originally possessed or acquired
65.
66.

without coercion, deception, or theft."); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA.
L. REv. 1449, 1527 (1990).
Mossoff, supra note 51, at 377-78.
Krier, supra note 51, at 139-40 (citing Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory ofProperty Rights,
57 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 347, 350-53 (1967)); Merrill, supra note 51, at 746
(quoting WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

72.

ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND (1983)).
Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 51, at 534-44; Merrill, supra note 51, at 734.
Mossoff, supra note 51, at 379-389.
Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 51, at 541 (citing ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS P 5, at 26
(Stephen Everson ed., 1988)).
Robert C. Ellickson, Propertyin Land, 102 YALE L. J. 1315, 1365 (1993).
See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 51, at 731, 737-38 ("For the Realists, property was not defined
by a single right or definitive trilogy of rights. Rather it is a 'bundle of rights.' Moreover, this
bundle has no fixed core or constituent elements. It is susceptible of an infinite number of
variations, as different 'sticks' or 'strands' are expanded or diminished, added to or removed
from the bundle altogether."); Reed, supranote 51, at 472-73; see also Cohen, supra note 51,
at 369, 370-71 ("ownership can exist without the possibility of the owner's enjoying or using
what he owns"); Looper-Friedman, supra note 64, at 278; Margaret Jane Radin, MarketInalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849 (1987) (positing that the right to sell (alienability) is
not necessarily attributed to property and offering a new conception of property rights for
things that are still identified as property but should not be sold in a market system (marketinalienability)).
See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 51, at 545-46; Mossoff, supra note 51, at 376;
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Margaret Radin notes that the right to dispose by sale can be limited or
completely removed from the bundle for a variety of resources typically
described as property without removing the property label from those
resources. 73 Supreme Court jurisprudence is consistent with this position.
Deciding that a statutory ban on selling eagle feathers did not dissolve the
property label in its entirety, the Court stated that "the denial of one traditional
property right does not always amount to a taking. At least where an owner
possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the
bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety." 74
Fourth, pursuant to the Constitution, the government may not unduly
infringe upon an individual's property rights without providing due process of
law75 and just compensation for the loss.76 While the Constitution does not
provide for specific property ownership, 77 it creates a general principle of
communal property protection, and scholars have articulated a variety of reasons
why the Constitution may in fact require states to create and implement systems
designed to protect individuals' existing property interests.
Fifth, property-the stuff over which individuals assert rights-is generally
defined by bodies of law other than the Constitution, including state law or
federal statutes. 79 As the Supreme Court stated, "[p]roperty interests. . . are not
Nelson, supra note 64, at 545; Reed, supra note 51, at 472 (identifying "[tihe positive rights
comprising this bundle [as] the rights to possess, to use, to manage, to generate income, to
consume or destroy, to alienate, and to transmit through devise and bequeath"); see also
Merrill, supra note 51, at 736-37 (acknowledging the rights of "possession, use, and
disposition," as articulated by Blackstone, and the list of eleven "standard" property rights
proffered by A.M. Honor6, but arguing that the right to exclude is nonetheless the ultimate
and most central property right).
73. Radin, supra note 71, at 1855-57 (identifying numerous "contested issues" that might be
market-inalienable), 1918-20 (describing work and housing as areas of the market that are
not fully commodified because of regulations impacting the ways in which payments may be
exchanged), 1921-36 (applying market-inalienability to baby-selling, prostitution, and
surrogacy); accord Cohen, supra note 5 1, at 369 ("there is such a thing as non-saleable
property"); Radin, Liberal Conception,supra note 51, at 1673.

74. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) (citations omitted); see also Erik S. Jaffe,
"She's Got Bette Davis['s] Eyes": Assessing the Nonconsensual Removal of Cadaver
Organs Under the Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 528, 550-51

(1990) ("The right to sell is not necessarily tied to the notion of property.").
75. U.S. CONST. amend. V; XIV, § 1.
76.

U.S. CONST. amend. V. See generally Radin, Liberal Conception, supra note 51 (surveying

takings jurisprudence), at 1668-84; Reed, supra note 51, at 485-86; Thompson, supra note
64.
77.

See Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the

FourteenthAmendment, 41 DUKE L. J. 507, 561-62 (1991). Cf Radin, supra note 71, at 1900
(citing Feinberg, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life, 7 PHIL. & PUB.

AFF. 93, 115-16 (1978)) ("[T]he right to own property is a discretionary right because I may
choose to own nothing; it is a nonrelinquishable discretionary right because I cannot morally
or legally renounce the right to own property even if I choose not to own any.").
78.

79.

See Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the Reality of American Constitutional
Exceptionalism, 107 MICH. L. REv. 391, 454-59 (2008); Heyman, supra note 77; Charles A.
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964); Robin West, Rights, Capabilities,and
the Good Society, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1901 (2001).
See, e.g., Looper-Friedman, supra note 64, at 275; Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of

HeinOnline -- 27 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 39 2012

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF GENDER, LAW & JUSTICE

40

created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that
support claims of entitlement to those benefits."80
It is largely from these five premises that defining the body as property
may be accomplished.
III. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE BODY

Relying on the general property principles discussed above, this Part
examines the history of body ownership and certain related theories of body
property. Such theories, however, do not fully align with the current state of law
and society vis-A-vis body property. Accordingly, this Part offers a new theory of
body property consistent with both historical and modem body ownership,
ultimately applying this theory and current law to support a finding of property
rights in the uterus.
Some early legal theorists posited broad general property rights in the
body. In the early seventeenth century, Grotius recognized a person's property
right in his or her "life" and "limbs." 81 Approximately a century later, John
Locke stated that "every [Wom]an has a Property in [her] own Person."82 One of
the Founding Fathers, James Madison, also asserted that a person had property
rights in her "safety and liberty" and "the free use of [her] faculties." Justice
Cardozo agreed: "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right
to determine what shall be done with [her] own body ....
Modem scholars have dealt with body ownership in greater complexity, a
necessity given biotechnological developments. Margaret Radin, in her seminal
piece, Property and Personhood, offers an insightful look at property rights
generally and posits that there should be two levels of property protection based
on how closely tied to personhood a particular thing might be.85 She identifies
"property that is bound up with a person" as "personal property" worthy of
heightened protection and "property that is held purely instrumentally" as

80.
81.
82.

ConstitutionalProperty, 86 VA. L. REv. 885, 917-21 (2000).
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
Mossoff, supranote 51, at 383 & n.43-44.
Id at 388 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT

§

27, 287-88 (Peter

Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690)). Other scholars have frequently quoted this
83.

line. See, e.g., Radin, Property and Personhood,supra note 51, at 965.
JAMES MADISON, Property, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 101 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,

Knickerbocker Press 1906), quoted in Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100
YALE L. J. 127, 135 (1990).
84. See Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). The plaintiff asserted
that physicians performed surgery on her without her consent. Justice Cardozo, writing for
the majority, stated that "the wrong complained of is not merely negligence. It is trespass.

Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
85.

done with [her] own body. . . ." Id. at 129.
Radin, Property andPersonhood,supra note 51, at 960.
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"fungible property" worthy only of a milder form of protection.86 For example,
an engagement ring is fungible property for a jeweler, replaceable by insurance
proceeds, but that same ring becomes personal property once a soon-to-be fianc6
purchases it, and certainly remains personal once the purchaser places the ring on
the left ring finger of his or her beloved, rendering insurance proceeds after a
theft insufficient. 87
It appears axiomatic, and Professor Radin acknowledges, that the physical
body is a necessary element of personhood." Thus, according to her argument, it
could follow that an individual would have what Professor Radin calls "personal
property" rights in the body as a whole. 89 According to Guido Calabresi, a legal
doctrinalist would come to this initial conclusion.90 Judge Calabresi's
doctrinalist, however, "would most likely have to concede that such a starting
point [of ownership of our own bodies] is not so firm that deviations from it, at
times judicial and more often legislative, would necessarily be unconstitutional
or in other ways anathema to the system." 91 Professor Radin comes to a
conclusion aligned with the doctrinalist's concession, and seemingly opposite to
the result that might have followed from her starting point, stating that "[b]odily
integrity is an attribute and not an object," and accordingly, that the body in its
entirety is "too personal even to be personal property."92 She intimates that
recognizing property rights in the whole body is too great a risk, ringing too true
to slavery, and would cause "violence" to personhood and human flourishing,

86.
87.

Id.
Id at 959-60, 987-88.

88.

Id. at 963 (citing P. F. STRAWSON, INDIVIDUALS: AN ESSAY IN DESCRIPTIVE METAPHYSICS
87-116 (1959); see also BERNARD WILLIAMS, Are Persons Bodies?, in PROBLEMS OF THE

89.

90.
91.

92.

SELF 64 (1973); BERNARD WILLIAMS, Bodily Continuity and Personal Identity, in
PROBLEMS OF THE SELF 19 (1973); BERNARD WILLIAMS, Personal Identity and
Individuation, in PROBLEMS OF THE SELF 1, 12 (1973); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN,
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 178 (G. E. M. ANSCOMBE trans., 3d ed. 1958).
Id. at 966 ("If the body is property, then objectively it is property for personhood. This line
of thinking leads to a property theory for the tort of assault and battery: Interference with my
body is interference with my personal property.").
Guido Calabresi, An Introduction to Legal Thought: Four Approaches to Law and to the
Allocation ofBody Parts,55 STAN. L. REV. 2113, 2133, 2136 (2003).
Id. at 2136. Judge Calabresi also notes the following:
[T]he landscape [of body ownership] is by no means so neat; the marks don't all
point in one direction. Thus, people can be conscripted into the military against
their will and be made to put their bodies to the service of the common good. Once
there they may be subjected, without their knowledge, to dreadful experiments with
drugs, and not even have the right to compensation, let alone the right to prevent
such a taking of their bodies and minds . . . . And in more than a few jurisdictions
[people] are, or were in the past, far from free to destroy [their bodies] in part (selfmutilation) or in whole (suicide). Finally women for the longest of times were
obliged to give their bodies to save their fetuses or unborn children. And some
courts in some states have indicated that women may be punished if they don't care
for their bodies, that is, make them, for a time, a public utility, for the benefit of
their unborn.
Id. at 2134-35 (internal marks and citations omitted).
Radin, supra note 71, at 1880-81.
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despite her market-inalienability modification of traditional notions of property
and market rhetoric. 93 Yet, the position that the body as a whole is not property
seems to run afoul of the legal truth that whole dead bodies are recognized as at
least quasi-property in certain circumstances. 94 Perhaps, then, the line of
demarcation for whole-body property ownership falls between whole living
bodies and whole dead bodies. 95
As for body parts, Professor Radin posits that they appropriately can be
considered property after removal from the whole. 96 At least one other scholar
has followed suit, delineating body parts as property only after removal. 9 7 This
theory of body ownership, however, fails to recognize the impetus for removing
the part in the first instance, which necessarily arises while the part is still
attached to the whole. Stated otherwise, the property value-whether monetary
or otherwise-must be cognizable to the person prior to the part's removal;
people do not randomly remove body parts without motivation for doing so.
There must be some reason for removing those parts, and in many
circumstances, that reason is to dispose of the parts by transferring them to
others, whether by donation or monetary sale. 9 8
Indeed, the reality of ova or oocyte sales defies the theory that body parts
can only be called property once removed. In ova or oocyte sale process, a young
woman (the so-called "donor") enters into a contract with a recipient woman,
and potentially with other parties, for the transfer of donor eggs prior to their
actual retrieval. 99 An egg donation contract might expressly stipulate that the

93.
94.

95.
96.

97.

Id. at 1884-85.
For example, quasi-property rights are recognized in dead bodies, vested with surviving
family members or with other designated persons, to ensure disposal in accordance with the
decedent's wishes. See Lisa Milot, What Are We-Laborers,Factories,or Spare Parts? The
Tax Treatment ofTransfers ofHuman Body Materials, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1053, 108386, 1106 (2010); Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV.
359, 382-87, 446-53 (2000).
See Rao, supra note 94, at 446-53. But see Looper-Friedman, supra note 64, at 276-77
(discussing property rights in the live bodies of debtors, slaves, and wives).
Radin, Property and Personhood,supranote 51, at 966. Radin posits:
The idea of property in one's body presents some interesting paradoxes. In some
cases, bodily parts can become fungible commodities, just as other personal
property can become fungible with a change in its relationship with the owner ....
On the other hand, bodily parts may be too "personal" to be property at all. We
have an intuition that property necessarily refers to something in the outside world,
separate from oneself Though the general idea of property for personhood means
that the boundary between person and thing cannot be a bright line, still the idea of
property seems to require some perceptible boundary, at least insofar as property
requires the notion of thing, and the notion of thing requires separation from self
This intuition makes it seem appropriate to call parts of the body property only after
they have been removed from the system.
Id
Philippe Ducor, The Legal Status of Human Materials, 44 DRAKE L. REv. 195, 203-19

(1996).
98.
99.

See supra notes 59, 72-74 and accompanying text.
The Process, EGG DONATION, INC., https://www.eggdonor.com/egg-donation-process/eggdonor-legal-process/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). Young women at top universities are highly
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donor owns her eggs while in her ovaries, but relinquishes ownership rights in
those eggs once removed. 100 The property rights thus preexist the "aspiration" of
the eggs.o10 Similarly, property rights, and specifically the right to dispose of the
property in a manner of the owner's choice, necessarily arise prior to the removal
of blood and hair, which may be sold or donated, and kidneys, which may be
donated.102 Therefore, the theory that removal from the body gives rise to
property rights in the removed body parts fails; these rights inherently arise in
advance of removal from the whole.
An alternative legal theory delineating the body parts for which people
receive property rights turns on renewability. This theory might seem the most
obvious, and potentially the most accessible, but if true, it would defeat a claim
for property rights in the uterus. Blood, hair, and sperm, for example, are all
regenerative body resources for which property rights have been recognized. 0 3
The property rights in these body parts even include commercial alienation,
considered by some to be the "norm of property."'104 A segment of the liver may
be donated by a living donor, though not sold, and the remaining organ will
regenerate the missing piece. 05
However, this theory of body property based on renewability also can be
refuted. For example, consider egg donations, as discussed above. Ova exist only

desirable egg donors and are recruited through college newspapers, popular websites such as
Facebook and craigslist, and even highway billboards. Advertisements in newspapers at
Harvard, Yale, and Princeton have offered as much as $35,000 for an egg donor, far
exceeding the recommended compensation limit of $10,000. A study published in The
Hastings Center Report stated that with every 100-point increase in a university's average
SAT scores, the egg donor advertisements in campus newspapers increased by $2,000. See
David Tuller, Payment Offers to Egg Donors PromptScrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 20 10, at

D5.
100. Mark A. Johnson, Prototype Egg Donation Contract with Commentary, at I 1(c), AM.
SURROGACY CTR., INC., http://www.surrogacy.com/articles/newsview.asp?ID=79 (last
visited Oct. 20, 2011). The egg donation process is too invasive for the process to go forward
without a preexisting contract in place. After applying to become an egg donor and
successfully completing medical and psychological screening tests, the donor receives
injections of Lupron to suppress her natural menstrual cycle and synchronize it with that of
the recipient. Once the menstrual cycles have been synchronized, the donor receives daily
injections of a fertility drug to stimulate the ovaries. When the ovarian follicles reach a
sufficient maturity level, the donor receives yet another injection, this time of human
chorionic gonadotropin (hCG), to replicate the hormone normally produced by a fertilized
embryo. The eggs can be retrieved approximately 36 hours after the hCG injection, during
which retrieval the donor receives "mild sedation" and a physician inserts a needle, fitted

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

onto an ultrasound probe, into the follicles to extract the eggs, essentially via vacuum. See
The Process, supra note 99; In- Vitro FertilizationProcess: Egg Retrieval, DUKE FERTILITY
CTR., http://dukefertilitycenter.org/treatments/in-vitro-fertilization/egg-retrieval/ (last visited
Oct. 20, 2011).
The Process, supra note 99.
See Calabresi,supra note 90, at 2134 & n. 85-86.
Milot, supra note 94, at 1060-61; Rao, supra note 94, at 371-73.
Rao, supranote 94, at 433-39.
Living Donation:Information You Need to Know, UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING,
Aug. 2009, at 3, 11, availableat http://www.unos.org/docs/LivingDonation.pdf (last visited
Oct. 20, 2011).
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in a finite amount within each woman's body, but they can be donated and sold,
evidencing the recognition of property rights. Similarly, modem medical
technology and science have achieved transplants from live donors of entire
kidneys, recognizing the property right of disposal, but the donor's body does
not create a new kidney to replace the one donated. 106 Likewise, living donors
may donate a lobe of the lung and portions of both the pancreas and the intestine,
again inherently recognizing the existence of a property right of disposal, despite
the fact that none of these body parts regenerate.10 7 Thus, regeneration cannot be
the theory giving rise to property rights in body parts.
A more viable theoretical demarcation lies in recognizing property rights in
body parts that can be safely removed without causing death or dismemberment
to the living donor. 1o All of the parts discussed above-blood (one pint at a
time), hair, sperm, eggs, a kidney, a lung lobe, and portions of the pancreas and
intestine-may be removed without seriously harming the donor. Bone marrow
also may be donated without causing the donor's death or dismemberment.109
Property rights have also been recognized in spleen cells, which may be removed
in reasonable proportion without the donor sustaining serious harm. 110 A living
individual may not, however, donate an arm, a leg, a heart, eyes, skin, a tongue,
a stomach, a penis, a breast, a liver, a pancreas, or a whole intestine, 11 likely
because such a donation would lead to the donor's death or dismemberment.
Under this safe removal theory, property rights could be recognized in the
uterus. Physicians can perform a total hysterectomy on a woman and, although
she will have lost her reproductive capacities,I12 barring serious medical
106. Id; see also Milot, supra note 94, at 1063.
107.

Transplant Living: Organ Donation and TransplantationInformation for Patients, UNITED
NETWORK

108.

109.

FOR

ORGAN

SHARING,

INC.,

http://www.transplantliving.org/livingdonation/facts/organs.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
Stated otherwise, the tenet might be that property rights are recognized in the body if the
original user no longer needs it. This phrasing would also account for the donation of whole
dead bodies, for which purposes quasi-property rights are recognized in that dead body to
ensure disposal in accordance with the decedent's wishes, while still avoiding recognition of
a property right in a whole living person. Obviously, a living person needs a body.
See Steps of Bone Marrow or PBSC Donation, NAT'L MARROW DONOR PROGRAM,

http://marrow.org/RegistryMembers/Donation/StepsofDonation.aspx (last accessed Nov.
24, 2011).
110. Cf Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of CA, 793 P.2d 479, 488-89 (Cal. 1990) (declining to
extend a continuing property interest in spleen cells after excision from the body when the
donor intended for the cells to be removed, tested, and destroyed); Rao, supra note 94, at
374-75 ("A ... possible reading [of Moore] is that, even if the spleen was initially Moore's
property, it had been essentially abandoned by its 'owner' for whom the diseased organ bore
little value and hence became capable of appropriate by another.").
111.

Cf Living Donation, supra note 105, at 1.

112.

Notably, removal of reproductive capacity might constitute a disability protected by the
Americans with Disabilities Act. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998) (holding
that reproduction is a "major life activity" impaired by HIV infection, impairment warranting
protection under the ADA). Likewise, decreased kidney function might constitute a
disability, depending on the extent of the symptoms associated with that decreased function.
Nonetheless, property rights exist in the kidneys. Accordingly, property rights might also
exist in the uterus.
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complications, the procedure will not endanger her life or result in the loss of a
limb.
Recognizing a woman's property right in her uterus is not, of course,
without concern, the most prominent of which might rest in commodification of
women's reproductive systems. After all, one of the bundled rights most
frequently associated with property among the general population is perhaps the
right to sell. Though current medical science and technology allow for the body
to be fragmented into a variety of parts,113 each of which might be considered
property as described above, the right to sell that property does not necessarily
follow. Just as liver lobes and kidneys may be donated but not sold,114 so too can
a uterus, all without the property label being revoked. ' Stated otherwise, under
the safe removal theory, these parts can be recognized as property despite being
unavailable for sale.
Professor Radin's market-inalienability concept allows for the uterus to be
considered property, worthy of a variety of other rights and protections in the
bundle, but safe from market forces. Like the kidney, a woman's uterus can be
her property, entitling her to the right to exclude, without it being available for
monetary sale. The Supreme Court has already demonstrated that removal of this
particular stick from the bundle does not obviate the property label, or other
property rights.116 Market-inalienability also protects against fears of
commodification of the living body as a whole. 117 The same protection might
even apply to surrogacy because of the whole-body nature of pregnancy.
Accordingly, under the safe removal theory, the uterus can be considered a
woman's property. This ownership would carry in its bundle the right to use, the
right to exclude, and the right to dispose by donation, but not the right to dispose
by sale.

113.

Halewood, supra note 61, at 140.

114.

Living Donation,supra note 105, at 3.

115.

See Andrus v. Allard 444 U.S. 59 (1979) (revoking the market-alienability of eagle feathers
without revoking the feathers' status as property).

116. Id.
117. See Radin, supra note 71, at 1880-81. These fears come to the foreground through
prostitution and pornography. The author subscribes to the feminist perspective that women
only engage in such activities because of financial compensation and not some burning
internal desire to sell their sexuality. Further, the author suspects that if such activities were
not market-compensable, the frequency of such activities would significantly decrease and,
in the case of normalized pornography, perhaps disappear entirely, although "sexts" (the
practice among youngsters to send sexually explicit picture messages to each other via
cellular phone texting) and amateur pornographic endeavors might persist, even without
monetary compensation.
118. As women who have been pregnant can attest, pregnancy is a whole-body experience. For
descriptions of the biological processes of pregnancy, including nausea, weight gain, and the
details of how a fertilized embryo implants in the uterine wall, see Jeffrey D. Goldberg,
Comment, Involuntary Servitudes: A Property-Based Notion of Abortion-Choice, 38

U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1597, 1609-12 (1991); Regan, supra note 24, at 1579-82. Selling the body
to engage in this activity, in some sense, commodifies the whole rather than merely the part
that serves as the locus, i.e., the uterus.
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IV.

GAINING GROUND WITH UTERINE PROPERTY

Identifying property rights in the uterus gains much ground for advancing
abortion rights and access. First, as others have argued, the state may not
appropriate private property for public good without providing just
compensation, or the appropriation becomes an unconstitutional taking pursuant
to the Fifth Amendment.' 19 As discussed in legal scholarship,' 20 the basis for the
takings argument in the abortion context might stem from the oft-cited
philosophical article by Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense ofAbortion, published
two years before the Supreme Court issued its decision in Roe v. Wade.12 1
Thomson provides a quintessential hypothetical:
You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an
unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to
have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all
the available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood
type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist's
circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to
extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The director of the hospital
now tells you, ". . .To unplug you would be to kill him. But never mind, it's
only for nine months ...122
The argument proceeds that, despite what might be the nice thing to do, or
even the "moral" thing to do-what the "Good Samaritan" would do l2-the
government may not mandate that you donate your body to save the life of the
violinist. Stated otherwise, the government may not mandate that women devote
their bodies to pregnancy in the name of a state interest in preserving potential
fetal life.124
The problem with the Takings Clause argument is that, like the argument
rooted in the Equal Protection Clause, no positive rights to government
protection and funding come from it. Only the negative right to keep the
government out arises. While this might satisfy a Libertarian, it fails to solve the
plight of low-income women seeking abortions. A constitutional prohibition on
anti-abortion laws does not, on this ground, carry affirmative rights to public

119. See Goldberg, supra note I18; Looper-Friedman, supra note 64. Both of these authors base
their takings arguments on a property right in the body as a whole. As noted herein, however,
such a premise runs afoul of the special nature of women's personhoods. See Radin,
120.

Property and Personhood,supra note 5 1.
See Goldberg, supra note 118, at 1598.

121.

Thomson, supra note 13. The Thomson article has also served as a basis for abortion rights
arguments grounded in equal protection doctrine. See, e.g., Regan, supra note 24; Sunstein,
supra note 9, at 31-32.

122.
123.
124.

Thomson, supra note 13, at 48-49.
Id. at 62-64; see also Regan, supranote 24, at 1571-1610.
See Goldberg, supra note 118, at 1641-45; Looper-Friedman, supra note 64, at 281-83.
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funding for abortion procedures, abortion clinics, or even abortion education.125
Further, the Takings Clause constricts only government action, not the action of
private citizens. In the matter at hand, the government might argue it has an
interest in protecting potential fetal life, but the fetus itself is not a government
actor, so the Takings Clause falls short.
In addition, an unconstitutional taking can, by the textual terms, be
remedied once the government offers the property owner just compensation.126
Susan Looper-Friedman offers a justification for this compensation scheme,
stating that "it is precisely this requirement of compensation that may result in
giving women what they have not achieved from abortion legislation to date: that
is, consideration of all the costs of such legislation, including the burdens it
places on women."' 27 How is it possible, though, to assign a market value to the
appropriation of a woman's body purely for the benefit of a potential other, for a
period of nine months, when "for a woman who does not want a child,
pregnancy is very burdensome indeed" 128? Another scholar posited that the
taking would be cost-prohibitive, given the more easily quantifiable costs of
medical care, extra food, maternity clothes, and lost wages, as well as the costs
associated with a woman's labor which, inherently, are harder to quantify.129
These assessments miss the point. To put a price on a woman's body, her
internal and external labor, her coerced step into the relegated role of mandatory
mother, 130 commodifies her personhood.' 3 ' It renders her, in her entirety, a
market good. This result stinks of slavery-the government buys her servitude.
This simply cannot be the justifiable end to the abortion debate.
Hence an argument under the Takings Clause is both insufficient and
inappropriate. A woman's uterine property rights cannot be so limited. As
indicated above, the most central right associated with property-the sine qua
non, according to some-is the right to exclude others from it. 13 Private
property exists for the use of the owner. Pursuant to the right to exclude, owners
can eject unwanted persons and objects from their property.133 Some of the
earliest cases recorded in the legal history of the United States confirm this

125.

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See Goldberg, supra note 118, at 1654 (citing Olsen, supra note 24, at 112-13) ("Olsen is
greatly concerned that poor women frequently lack sufficient funds to obtain abortions if
necessary and a property-based theory of abortion-choice [resting on the Takings Clause]
fails to address this problem.").
See Looper-Friedman, supra note 64, at 283.
Id.
Regan, supra note 24, at 1582.
Goldberg, supra note 118, at 1645-46.
See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, WOMEN INWESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT: PERSONS, WOMEN
AND THE LAW 10 (1979); CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 128 (1988).
See Radin, Property and Personhood,supra note 51.
See supra Part It.
Looper-Friedman, supra note 64, at 281 (citing 6A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 28.128.21 (Andrew James Casner, ed., Little, Brown 1954); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 928-30 (1979)).
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premise.134 It follows that a woman with property rights in her uterus may
therefore eject a fetal trespasser.135
Similarly, with regard to the body, the Supreme Court has recognized the
right to exclude in the context of bodily integrity.' 3 6 Perhaps Thomson's violinist
hypothetical is more appropriately located at this point in the discourse. 37
Simply stated, individuals may not be forced to sacrifice their bodies, in any
way, to save the life of another.' 3 In the seminal case of McFall v. Shimp, the
plaintiff required a bone marrow transplant from the defendant in order to
survive, to which the defendant refused to consent.' 39 Holding that it could not
issue the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiff, the court stated that "one
human being is under no legal compulsion to give aid or to take action to save
another human being or to rescue."1 4 0 The court continued:
For a society which respects the rights of one individual, to sink its teeth into
the jugular vein or neck of one of its members and suck from it sustenance for
another member, is revolting to our hard-wrought concepts of jurisprudence.
Forceable [sic] extraction of living body tissue causes revulsion to the judicial
mind. Such would raise the spectre [sic] of the swastika and the Inquisition,
reminiscent of the horrors this portends.1 41
Notably, the result should not change even if a potential bone marrow
donor is listed on a registry, indicating at least some willingness to go forward
with the transplant.142 Supreme Court jurisprudence confirms that this right to
exclude from bodily invasion exists even when the body resisting invasion is that
of a suspected drug dealer 4 3 or robber.144 The Court nonetheless upheld the
134. See, e.g., Danforth v. Sargeant, 14 Mass. 491 (1780) (finding former tenants liable for
trespass because tenants remained on the leased property after the lease expired).
135. This is particularly true in the case of a woman whose life is at stake because of a pregnancy.
As Thomson states, "it cannot be concluded that you can do nothing, that you cannot attack
[the fetus] to save your life. However innocent the child may be, you do not have to wait
passively while it crushes you to death." Thomson, supra note 13, at 52.
136. See BORDO, supra note 18, at 72 (quoting Union Pacific Railway v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250,
251 (1891)); see also Calabresi,supra note 90, at 2134 (recognizing a right to refuse medical
treatment); Looper-Friedman, supra note 64, at 281 (same).
137. See supra notes 120-124 and accompanying text.
138. See Sunstein, supra note 9, at 33-35 ("It is striking that no American legislature has imposed
such a duty and that courts have refused to do so as well."); see also Thomson, supra note
13, at 61 ("nobody is morally required to make large sacrifices, of health, of all other
interests and concerns, or all other duties and commitments, for nine years, or even for nine
months, in order to keep another person alive") (emphasis in original).
139. McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C. 3d 90 (Allegheny County 1978).
140. Id. at 91; accord Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990) (refusing to compel toddler
twins to donate bone marrow to their half brother, who suffered from leukemia).
141. McFall, 10 Pa. D.& C.3d at92.
142. This is similar to a situation in which a woman voluntarily becomes pregnant and then
changes her mind. For a discussion of the issues surrounding this circumstance in the context
of a right to exclude a fetus from a uterus, see infra notes 184-212 and accompanying text.
143. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). In Rochin, the police broke into Rochin's
bedroom and forced him to take expectorant in order to regurgitate two morphine capsules,
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rights of these individuals to bodily integrity.' 4 5 The question at hand is whether
a viable method exists to secure the same rights for women with regard to their
reproductive lives.1 46 As explained herein, this article posits that one method to
consider is recognition of uterine property rights and, accordingly, the right to
exclude a fetus.
Although the right to exclude, on its own, might be sufficient grounds to
strike down anti-abortion laws,14 7 like the arguments based on and the results
stemming from the Takings and Equal Protection Clauses, it insufficiently
addresses the issue of access, particularly for poor women. To achieve universal
access to abortion, the uterine property right to exclude would need to receive
government sanction and support. In other words, the government must have a
duty to protect a woman's right to exclude a fetus from her uterus and, more
pointedly, to protect her from the violence that the fetus inherently commits.14 8
This duty to protect is the "first duty of government."' 49 Professor Steven
Heyman traces the right to governmental protection from violence to the very

144.

145.

146.

147.
148.
149.

which the state intended to use as evidence against him. The Court felt
compelled to conclude that the proceedings by which this conviction was obtained
do more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about
combatting [sic] crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience.
Illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth
and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's contents-this
course of proceeding by agents of government to obtain evidence is bound to offend
even hardened sensibilities. They are methods too close to the rack and the screw to
permit of constitutional differentiation.
Id at 172.
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985). In Winston, the Court refused to allow the state to
compel the surgical removal of a bullet fired by a robbery victim into the perpetrator only to
use that bullet as evidence against the perpetrator in prosecution.
Both lower courts in this case believed that the proposed surgery, which for purely
medical reasons required the use of a general anesthetic, would be an "extensive"
intrusion on respondent's personal privacy and bodily integrity. When conducted
with the consent of the patient, surgery requiring general anesthesia is not
necessarily demeaning or intrusive . . .. In this case, however, the Court of Appeals
noted that the Commonwealth proposes to take control of respondent's body, to
"drug this citizen-not yet convicted of a criminal offense-with narcotics and
barbiturates into a state of unconsciousness," and then to search beneath his skin for
evidence of a crime. This kind of surgery involves a virtually total divestment of
respondent's ordinary control over surgical probing beneath his skin.
Id. at 764-65 (internal citations omitted).
But see BORDO, supra note 18, at 74-76 (pitting the rights of suspected criminals against
those apparently absent from women's reproductive lives, relying on involuntary sterilization
and court-ordered obstetrical interventions).
See id. at 75-78. Professor Bordo recites instances in which pregnant women, in contrast to
the alleged criminals, have utterly lacked a right to bodily integrity and been forced to submit
to a cesarean section or cervical surgery, pursuant to court orders.
Perhaps the Privileges or Immunities Clause would be the appropriate constitutional vehicle,
were the analysis to end here. See Heyman, supranote 77, at 526.
See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
Heyman, supra note 77, at 507; accordMDONAGH, supra note 9, at 37, 101, 115-17, 12731; Gardbaum, supra note 78, at 455-56; West, supra note 78, at 1922-23.
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formation of this country.' 50 Just as the colonists received protection from the
king prior to their arrival on this continent, they formed a Union government to
Relying on the teachings of John Locke,
acquire the same protection.
Professor Heyman notes that "an individual often lacks the power to defend
himself against invasion by others" and for this reason, individuals form
communities that, with greater numbers, are better able to provide protection for
their members.1 52 Such protection is "[o]ne of the principal benefits" of joining
an organized society.' 5 3 Early state constitutions expressly recognized the
citizens' positive right to protection.154 For example, the Massachusetts
Constitution stated that "[e]ach individual of the society has a right to be
protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property, according to
standing laws.,,iss
By design, Professor Heyman contends, the federal Constitution provided
for the federal protection of the states, and the states in turn provided protection
for their respective citizens, since such responsibility was not an enumerated
federal power.156 "In this light, it is hardly surprising that the federal Bill of
Rights contained no guarantee of a right to protection similar to those found in
the state constitutions."' 57 Essentially, the Founding Fathers trusted the states to
adequately and appropriately protect the rights of their citizenry, and when the
states blatantly failed to do so in the mid-nineteenth century vis-t-vis slavery and
civil rights, Congress created the Fourteenth Amendment to ensure that the
federal government would have a mechanism of ensuring that states perform the
duty to protect originally reserved for them. As Professor Heyman explains,
the Congressional debates over the Fourteenth Amendment prove as much, 159
and the Supreme Court has since confirmed it.160
The duty to protect includes government protection of private property
against not only governmental intrusion but also private violence.161 Such
protection necessarily functions both retrospectively, through government
prosecution and punishment of offenders, and prospectively, though various

150.

Heyman, supra note 77, at 512-14.

151.

Id. at 515.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id
Id. at 517-18.
Id. at 522-24.
Id. at 523-24 (citation omitted).
Id. at 524-25.
Id. at 525 (citation omitted).

158.

Id. at 526, 547-48.

159.
160.

Id. at 546-57, 562-70.
See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 670, 673, 690-91,
694 (1978) (holding that municipalities, like states, are subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for alleged violations of individuals' constitutional rights based on a finding that the
Fourteenth Amendment creates a federal right to protection by the state or local
govemment).
Heyman, supra note 77, at 533 (referencing Blackstone's absolute rights to "security of
person and property").

161.
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government efforts to prevent violence,' 62 such as a legislature's obligation to
enact laws that protect life, liberty, and property.' 6 3 Police officers who failed to
enforce the laws and keep the peace were subject to criminal punishment, but not
civil liability to the person injured, due to sovereign immunity.' In sum, the
original state constitutions required states to create and implement systems of
laws, whether by legislative enactment or judicial interpretation, that protected
people from private actors' intrusions upon life, liberty, and property, and the
Fourteenth Amendment provided a vehicle for the federal government to force
the states to do so.165 As one delegate at the Congressional debates over the
Fourteenth Amendment stated, "if [a person] is assailed by one stronger than
himself the Government will protect him to punish the assailant . . . . [I]f an

intruder and trespasser gets upon [a person's] land he shall have a remedy to
recover it." 66
Accordingly, to protect individuals' property rights, states have enacted
and judicially written into common law numerous prohibitions against
trespass.167 Every state in the country prohibits trespass either civilly, criminally,
or both. 168 Though individual state actors might not have a duty to enforce the
trespass statute for a particular person,169 the state must maintain and enforce,
70
generally, an anti-trespass system to protect its citizens' property rights.'
Applying this framework to the pregnancy and abortion context, the fetus
is an intruder on a woman's uterine property, and the state should at minimum
maintain a system designed to assist in the intruder's removal.' 7' Since the state
cannot prevent the fetal intrusion from occurring in advance,' 72 it is left with
only one option, namely, to support its removal after the fact, in much the same
way that a police officer would remove a burglar or dangerous intruder,
regardless of the intruder's legal intent, from a person's house.173
So, the anti-trespass argument has progressed through the establishment of
uterine property to the right to exclude a fetal trespasser from that private
property. Further, the government has a primary duty to create and implement a
162.
163.

Id. at 534-36.
Id. at 536.

Id. at 539.
See Gardbaum,supra note 78, at 456-58.
Heyman, supra note 77, at 565 (citation omitted).
See, e.g., Ben Depoorter, FairTrespass, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1090, 1095-98 (2011); Merrill,
supra note 51, at 747; 87 C.J.S. Trespass § 154 (2011).
168. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-107, 53a-l 10a (West 2010).
169. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989); Town
of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
164.
165.
166.
167.

170.

See supra note 167.

171.

Cf MCDONAGH, supra note 9, at 36-37, 173-74. McDonagh employs the "fetus as intruder"
theory as a method of justifying self-defense, whereas usage of the theory herein rests in
trespass doctrine.
See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
See infra Part V for an analysis of how Supreme Court jurisprudence could generate this
result. Additionally, for a discussion of the use of lethal force against intruders, see infra
notes 189-212 and accompanying text.

172.
173.
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system designed to protect its citizens from harm, including harm caused to
property by trespassers. In the abortion context, that system of protection might
provide government funding for abortions.
Of course, the anti-trespass scheme is not above criticism. One critique of
the anti-trespass basis for abortion rights and access might be that it inherently
pits the interests of the woman against the interests of the fetus, something that
some feminists and pro-choice advocates have been trying to circumvent. It
seems untenable that any abortion rights analysis can truly avoid this clash. 174
The interests of a fetus and a woman who does not want to be pregnant
necessarily conflict.
The conflict, however, is not simply one between a fetus' interests and a
woman's interests, narrowly conceived, nor is the overriding issue state versus
private control of a woman's body for a span of nine months. Also in balance
is a woman's autonomous charge of her full life's course .

.

. her ability to

stand in relation to man, society, and the state as an independent, selfsustaining, equal citizen. 175
By recasting the interests of all the parties involved, including the fetus,
and acknowledging those interests as real, perhaps the debate could move
forward. Instead of awarding "super-subject" status to the fetus (rendering it as
the most important player), "true parent" status to the man-father (assuming the
father is both known and present), and mere "object" status to the womanmother, the discourse might benefit from a more neutral perspective on each of
the involved parties, including the state.176 Such could be the result of abortion
rights based on property doctrine, and specifically anti-trespass law. Though the
fetus might have an interest in growth and development-"life" when more
broadly construed-and the state might have an interest in protecting that
potential fetal life, such an interest might not outweigh a woman's property
interest in her uterus and the corresponding right to exclude intruders.177 At
174. Contra Looper-Friedman,supra note 64, at 263; Sunstein, supra note 9, at 32.
175. Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 383 (internal marks and citations omitted).
176. See BORDO, supra note 18, at 72, 75-78, 88-95.
177. It may become even more challenging to ascribe value to a position that the fetal/state
interests (and potentially the interests of the father) in protecting potential life outweigh the
uterine property rights of a pregnant woman with the advent of a fully artificial womb.
Scientists are developing a way for a baby to grow completely separate from a woman's
body. See, e.g., Sharon Guynup, Scientists Try to Build a Better 'Womb'for IVF, THE

BosTON GLOBE, Oct. 22, 2007, at Cl; Scott LaFee, Spare Womb; Will Artificial Wombs
Mean the End of Pregnancy?, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Feb. 25, 2004, at Fl; Jeremy
Rifkin, Evolution's Pregnant Pause: Artificial Wombs, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2002, at

California Metro, part 2, p. 11; Sacha Zimmerman, ECTOGENESIS; Development of
Artificial Wombs: Technology's Threat to Abortion Rights, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE,

Aug. 24, 2003, at D3. Once this technology reaches fruition, the interest in using a woman's
uterus against her will to support the potential life of a fetus, when a viable alternative exists,
seems to fall flat. Of course, the question of payment for use of this technology would still
remain. If the state is the party interested in preserving potential fetal life, then perhaps the
state must pay for the transfer of the fetus to the artificial womb, and the continued use of the
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bottom, this property-based framework can provide a new basis for grounding
the dialogue about these competing interests.
A second critique might be mounted against the governmental support
argument, suggesting that other government-supported programs are not as
costly as an abortion program might be. However, the state already provides
funding for childbirth, and the costs of pregnancy, delivery, and post-natal care
exceed those of abortion procedures.' 7 Notably, the federal government also
funds contraception, 17 9 and an argument could be made that contraception (like
abortion, as posited herein) rests on a woman's property right to exclude
invaders from her uterus. For fiscal year 2010, the federal government
appropriated over $300 million to Title X, the program that provides federal
funding for contraception through agencies like Planned Parenthood."s That
same amount could pay for hundreds of thousands of low-income women to
access abortions. The cost of government-funded abortion, therefore, does not
appear to be prohibitive.
A third set of critiques-and perhaps the most forceful-arises out of
property law defenses. 1 82 One component of this set posits as follows: if the
woman invites the fetus into her uterus by engaging in consensual sex, then the
fetus is not an intruder; it is, instead, a guest. This critique inappropriately
assumes that consent to sex equals consent to pregnancy.183 A woman can
consent to sexual intercourse without consenting to becoming pregnant.
Realistically, contraception methods fail; it is possible for women to become
pregnant through protected sex, thus consenting to the sex without consenting to
the pregnancy. Agreeing to the former does not inherently constitute an
acceptance of the latter. The discourse must unpack sex from reproduction.184
womb until birth. The fetus cannot pay these costs; the state funding might be something
akin to welfare or Medicaid coverage. On the other hand, perhaps the costs would be
imposed upon the fetus as a lien on future earnings.
178. Tribe, supra note 46, at 338.
179. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 et seq. (2010).
180.

See Erik Eckholm, Planned ParenthoodFinancingIs Caught in Budget Feud, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 17, 2011, at A16; Aimee Miles, A Guide to GOP ProposalsOn Family PlanningFunds,
KAISER
HEALTH
NEWS
(Mar.
9,
2011),

www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2011/February/18/planned-parenthood-title-10.aspx
visited August 4, 2011).
181.

(last

See In-Clinic Abortion Procedures at a Glance, PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF AM.,

http://www.plannedparenthood.org/health-topics/abortion/in-clinic-abortion-procedures4359.asp (last visited November 18, 2011) (listing the cost of abortions in the first trimester
at $300-$950).
182. Cf Goldberg,supra note 118, at 1632 (discussing the defense of estoppel, when the property
right was a revocable license).
183. Cf Thomson, supra note 13, at 58-59 ("If the room is stuffy, and I therefore open a window
to air it, and a burglar climbs in, it would be absurd to say, 'Ah, now he can stay, she's given
him a right to the use of her house-for she is partially responsible for his presence there,
having voluntarily done what enabled him to get in, in full knowledge that there are such
things as burglars, and that burglars burgle."').
184.

See, e.g., Ariela R. Dubler, Sexing Skinner: History and the Politics of the Right to Marry,

110 COLUM. L. REv. 1348, 1359 (2010). The LGBT rights movement might lend much
support to the existing push to unbundle sex from reproduction. See Shelley Mains and
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Sex for pleasure is a real possibility for both men and women only because of
the advent birth control. Beyond contraception use, and particularly in light of
contraceptive failures, women should be allowed to consent to sex without
consenting to pregnancy.
However, even segregating consensual sex from consensual pregnancy
does not help a woman who initially consented to the pregnancy but later
changes her mind. It is not difficult to imagine situations that might give rise to
this predicament. Perhaps a husband is killed during the course of a wife's
pregnancy and the wife no longer wants to carry the pregnancy to term. Perhaps
a woman's financial situation turns dire-not uncommon in today's economyand she wants to wait for more fiscal stability before bringing a child into the
world. The specifics are somewhat irrelevant; the predicament remains.
Essentially, a woman who owns the property of her uterus invited in a fetus who,
for somewhat obvious reasons, refuses to leave, and will suffer harm if forced to
do so. In this circumstance, the woman arguably owes the fetus a duty of
reasonable care.1 87 That having been said, the status of an invitee or licensee can
be reduced to a trespasser if the property owner revokes the privilege. A
trespasser may be ejected by force, even deadly force in some cases.
A recent case from Connecticut, the state that gave rise to foundational
jurisprudence in contraception,1 90 illustrates this point. In State v. Terwilliger,

185.

Stephanie Poggi, "Together We Will Get Somewhere": Working Together for Lesbian/Gay
Liberation and Reproductive Freedom, in FROM ABORTION TO REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM:
TRANSFORMING A MOVEMENT 281-90 (Marlene Gerber Fried ed., South End Press 1990).
See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire,

101 COLUM. L. REv. 181, 199-201, 203 (2001).
186. See, e.g., MCDONAGH, supra note 9, at 38; Sunstein, supra note 9, at 30; Tribe, supra note
46, at 337-38.
187.

See, e.g., 65A C.J.S.Negligence § 459 (2010).

188.

For example, a home owner who invites people over for dinner and catches one of the guests
trying to steal something from the house would likely ask that guest to leave. Once the invite
is revoked, if the guest refuses to vacate the premises, he or she becomes a trespasser.
A similar situation arose in the case of Depue v. Flateau, 11 N.W. 1 (Minn. 1907). In that
case, the plaintiff had dinner at the defendant's home and, shortly thereafter, became ill. The
defendant refused to allow the plaintiff to spend the night, and instead sent the plaintiff on
his way. The plaintiff fainted en route to his home, fell into the snow on the side of the road,
and spent the night there. When he was found in the morning, the plaintiff was nearly dead
from frostbite and, though he survived, he suffered serious injuries including the loss of
some fingers. The defendant was held liable for negligence because he failed to exercise
reasonable care for his guest. Id. at 2-3.
Depue can be distinguished from the uterine property and fetal trespass situation in two
important ways. First, the plaintiff in Depue fell ill while he was still an invitee. Once he was
told to leave, he did so. A fetal trespasser refuses to leave. The case does not stand for the
proposition that a property owner has duty to provide reasonable care to trespassers. Second,
and perhaps more persuasively, the plaintiff in Depue would not have caused any serious or
lasting harm to the defendant's home by spending the night. Conversely, a fetus stays in a
uterus for nine months, and has a significant impact while there.
189. 65A C.J.S. Negligence §§ 460, 465; 6A C.J.S. Assault §§ 32, 115. "The use of a dangerous
weapon or shooting of a trespasser may be justifiable in some circumstances, as where it is
necessary for self-defense . . . ." 6A C.J.S. Assault § 32 (internal notations omitted).
190.

See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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the defendant shot his step-daughter's husband, from whom the step-daughter
had separated.191 The defendant established that the victim was intoxicated,
acted in a threatening, violent, and uncontrollable way near the defendant's
home, and refused to leave even after being ordered off the defendant's
property. 192 Thus, the defendant was entitled to jury instructions that deadly
force can be used against a trespasser in order to prevent the victim "from
committing or attempting to commit a crime of violence on the premises."l 93
State statutory law is consistent with this holding, which statutes provide that a
property owner may use deadly force against a criminal trespasser "when he
reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent an attempt by the trespasser
to commit . . . any crime of violence" or "to the extent that he reasonably
believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate an unlawful entry by force
into his dwelling . . . and for the sole purpose of such prevention or

termination."' 94 Jurisprudence and statutory law from Texas, where Roe started,
provide a similar result. 195 The applicable sections of the Texas Penal Code state
that deadly force may be used when immediately necessary to prevent trespass or
other "unlawful interference with the property", to prevent criminal mischief in
the nighttime or some other aggravated offense, and when the property cannot be
protected any other way.196
In the uterine property context, these doctrines justify abortion as a method
of removing a fetal trespasser, even if the abortion results in the death of the
fetus. At present, the uterine property cannot be protected in any way other than
aborting the pregnancy. Further, the fetus causes at least interference with a
woman's use of her uterus and body; usually pregnancy causes a severe impact
on the uterus and the rest of a woman's body.197
A second critique arising from property law defenses concerns the
conflicting rights of the opposing parties-namely, the property owner and the
trespasser. In the broader property law context, both the trespasser and property
owner have basic rights that must be acknowledged. As will be shown herein,
however, this critique does not apply in the uterine property context because
191. 984 A.2d 721, 724-26 (Conn. 2009).
192. Id. at 729.
193. Id.
194. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-20 (West 2010); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a107(a) (West 2010) (defining criminal trespass).
195. See, e.g., Sparks v. State, 177 S.W.3d 127, 132 (Tx. App. 2005) (holding that defendant was
entitled to a jury instruction on defense of premises with deadly force); Hernandez v. State,
914 S.W.2d 218, 223-24 (Tx. App. 1996) (affirming that deadly force may be used to protect
property in certain circumstances, and holding that criminal mischief must be in progress or
imminent in order to justifiably use deadly force); Jackson v. State, 753 S.W.2d 706, 708-10
(Tx. App. 1988) (same).
196. TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 9.41(a), 9.42 (West 2011). Notably, a trespasser might have a right to
remain on the property to "prevent serious harm" to himself under the tort doctrine of private
necessity, but those circumstances are generally shorter in duration than nine months, and
carry liability to any harm done to the owner's legally protected interests. See REST.
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 197 (1965).
197. See, e.g., supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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fetuses are not "persons" within the context of the Constitution and thus do not
yet have such rights.
Several cases help to demonstrate the balance between the rights of owners
and trespassers. In State v. Shack, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a
field worker and an attorney who, over a farmer's objection, entered the farmer's
land to deliver services to migrant farmworkers living on the farm were beyond
the reach of the criminal trespass statute. 98 Though the farmer had rights
connected with his property ownership, those ownership rights could not trump
the workers' rights to "live with dignity and to enjoy associations customary
among our citizens." 1 99 Similarly, in PruneYardShopping Center v. Robins, the
Supreme Court held that the shopping mall had no authority to oust a small
200
rights of expression
While rgt
group of students seeking petition signatures.
arising under the First Amendment do not overcome a landowner's property
201
more expansive free
rights under the Fifth and/or Fourteenth Amendments,
speech rights guaranteed by the California Constitution conquered the
landowner's property rights. 20 2 In both these cases, other constitutional rights
defeated the right to exclude.
The major distinction between these two cases and the abortion case at
hand is that the constitutional rights at issue in Shack and PruneYard belonged to
people already living outside the womb. Simply put, regardless of when life may
or may not begin,203 as far as constitutional rights are concerned, "the word
,,204
1
person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.
Even "[i]n areas other than criminal abortion, the law has been reluctant to
198.
199.
200.
201.

277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971).
Id. at 374.
447 U.S. 74 (1980).
Id. at 80-81 (citing Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569-70 (1972); Hudgens v. NLRB,
424 U.S. 507, 517-21 (1976)).
202. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 81-83. The Supreme Court held that "the requirement that
[PruneYard] permit [the students] to exercise state-protected rights of free expression and
petition on shopping center property clearly does not amount to an unconstitutional
infringement of [PruneYard's] property rights under the Takings Clause." To reach this
holding, the Court relied on the following tenets:
It is true that one of the essential sticks in the bundle of property rights is the right
to exclude others. [] And here there has literally been a "taking" of that right to the
extent that the California Supreme Court has interpreted the State Constitution to
entitle its citizens to exercise free expression and petition rights on shopping center
property.[] But it is well established that "not every destruction or injury to property
by governmental action has been held to be a 'taking' in the constitutional sense." []
Rather, the determination whether a state law unlawfully infringes a landowner's
property in violation of the Taking Clause requires an examination of whether the
restriction on private property "forc[es] some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." [] This
examination entails inquiry into such factors as the character of the governmental
action, its economic impact, and its interference with reasonable investment-backed
expectations."
Id. at 82-83 (internal citations and notations omitted).
203. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,159 (1979).
204. Id. at 158.
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endorse any theory that life, as we recognize it, begins before live birth or to
accord legal rights to the unborn. . . . In short, the unborn have never been

recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense."20 S Whatever discrete rights
might be recognized for fetuses, such as the right to inherit property, such rights
do not vest until the fetus is born alive. 206 Nothing in the string of cases forming
the progeny of Roe changes the holding that a fetus is not a person within the
context of constitutional rights. 207 In the uterine property context, given this
Supreme Court jurisprudence, a fetus can be considered a person for purposes of
committing the trespass (and perhaps for other discrete rights mentioned above)
but cannot hold all of the constitutional rights of a living born person. Indeed, if
this basic premise no longer held true, then all abortions would be criminal,
because each procedure would deprive a "person" of "life" in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Although the state in PruneYardasserted its interests in
promoting free speech by affording free expression and petition rights beyond
the floor set by the Constitution, those rights still belonged to individuals
existing outside the womb.
Further examination of the Court's holding in PruneYard offers additional
points of distinction between the case of unwanted petitioners in a shopping mall
and the case of an unwanted fetus in a uterus. First, the shopping center could
restrict the petitioners' activity "by adopting time, place, and manner regulations
that will minimize any interference with its commercial functions."208 A
pregnant woman does not have that option; the pregnancy has systemic bodily
effects for its duration, and potentially continuing thereafter, not to mention the
life-altering result of motherhood. Second, dismissing the shopping center's
asserted First Amendment right not to be compelled to use its property to express
the opinions of others, the Court states that the shopping center was not part of
the owners' personal daily lives.209 A pregnant woman uses her body every day,
all day, without fail.
205.

Id. at 161-62.

206.

See KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION & THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 3-4 (1984).

207.

See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 912-14
(1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[A]n abortion is not 'the
termination of life entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection.' . . . From this holding [in
Roe v. Wade], there was no dissent; ... indeed, no Member of the Court has ever questioned
this fundamental proposition. Thus, as a matter of federal constitutional law, a developing
organism that is not yet a 'person' does not have what is sometimes described as a 'right to
life.' This has been and, by the Court's holding today, remains a fundamental premise of our
constitutional law governing reproductive autonomy.") (internal marks and citations
omitted); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 568 n. 13 (1989) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also U.S. v. Montgomery, 635 F.3d 1074,
1086 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that "Congress did not . . . expand the term 'person' to include
the unborn in its enactment of the Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004."); Lewis v.
Thompson, 252 F.3d 567, (2d Cir. 2001) ("Lacking the status of a Fourteenth Amendment
'person,' a fetus cannot validly claim a denial of equal protection . . . and there is no basis for
contending that such a claim fares any better under the equal protection component of the
Fifth Amendment.").
PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 83.
Id. at 87 (distinguishing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)).

208.
209.
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Additionally, the Court in PruneYardheld that the shopping center owners
were not "being compelled to affirm their belief in any governmentally
prescribed position or view, and they are free to publicly dissociate themselves
from the views of the speakers or handbillers." 2 10 It is hard to envision how a
pregnant woman can avoid sending a message, whether or not intentional, that
she supports child-bearing. The pregnancy is usually apparent by the second
trimester.211 Poor women who would rather abort the pregnancy but lack the
funds to do so are essentially "compelled to affirm their belief in [the]
governmentally prescribed position"212 that childbirth is preferred over abortion.
Accordingly, although the right to exclude lost in the shopping center context, it
might succeed in the abortion context.
V.

SECURING ABORTION RIGHTS AND ACCESS THROUGH UTERINE
PROPERTY

The question still remains how to get there from here. Interestingly enough,
neither Roe nor the cases forming its progeny address a property-based theory
supporting abortion rights and access thereto. 213 All of these cases proceeded on
a privacy-based argument, advanced through the liberty right in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 214 The property-based argument has not been
foreclosed; it has never been offered. The doctrine of stare decisis does not
preclude a new argument based on a different theory. In the current post-Harris
world where federal dollars may not be spent on abortions,215 a property-based
210.

Id. at 88.

This may not be the case for extremely overweight women.
PruneYard,447 U.S. at 88.
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1979); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Casey,
505 U.S. 833; Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124
(2007).
214. Again, it is the liberty-based right to privacy that, as the foundation for abortion rights, gives
rise to so much skepticism, and it is precisely this widely-criticized foundation that this
article attempts to circumvent by providing a viable alternative. Supreme Court Justices have
offered several examples of that skepticism. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 174 (Rehnquist, J.
dissenting); Casey, 505 U.S. at 951-53 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part); Casey, 505 U.S. at 980, 983-84 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 ("The Constitution does not
explicitly mention any right of privacy.")
215. See Harris, 448 U.S. 297. In Harris, the Supreme Court considered certain statutory and
constitutional questions raised by the Hyde Amendment, which prohibited the use of federal
funds to reimburse under the Medicaid program any costs associated with abortions. Id. at
301-02. The first iteration of the Hyde Amendment emerged in 1976, but the 1980 version
was current when the Court decided Harris, which version stated, in pertinent part, that no
federal funds appropriated to Medicaid "'shall be used to perform abortions except where the
life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term; or except for such
medical procedures necessary for the victims of rape or incest when such rape or incest has
been reported promptly to a law enforcement agency or public health service.'" Id. at 302
(internal citation omitted). Some earlier versions of the Hyde Amendment contained "an
additional exception for 'instances where severe and long-lasting physical health damage to
the mother would result if the pregnancy were carried to term when so determined by two
physicians."' Id. at 303 (internal marks and citation omitted). Plaintiffs in Harris alleged,

211.
212.
213.

HeinOnline -- 27 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 58 2012

REFRAMING ROE

59

abortion entitlement argument might proceed under the following framework.
Janet Jones is a pregnant woman who receives welfare payments and
Medicaid coverage. She desires to have an abortion but cannot afford to pay for
the procedure. The state maintains a policy and custom 2 16 of refusing to pay for
abortions, even though Jones receives other forms of state financial support due
to her poverty. Because a fetus is trespassing in her uterus, and Jones has a
property right therein, the state's policy of refusing to cover abortion coststhereby refusing to eject the trespasser-deprives Jones of her property in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Harrismay be distinguished because the underlying analysis of that case
differs from the reasoning offered here. Harris, like Roe and other cases that
came before it, as well as the progeny that came after, relied on a privacy-based
analysis, yielding a discussion of whether the absence of federal funding violated
any constitutional liberty guarantees.217 Answering this question in the negative,
in Harris,the Court stated that the Hyde Amendment "places no governmental
obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy, but
rather, by means of unequal subsidization of abortion and other medical services,
encourages alternative activity deemed in the public interest." 218 The Court
continued, holding that "although government may not place obstacles in the
path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those
not of its own creation. Indigency falls in the latter category." 21 9 The right to

216.
217.
218.
219.

among other things, that the Hyde Amendment violated the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments of the Constitution because it fully funded childbirth but denied such funding
for abortions, including medically necessary abortions, except in the narrow circumstances
expressly iterated. Id. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment. Id. at
316-18, 319-20, 322-26.
[R]egardless of whether the freedom of a woman to choose to terminate her
pregnancy for health reasons lies at the core or the periphery of the due process
liberty recognized in Wade, it simply does not follow that a woman's freedom of
choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail
herself of the full range of protected choices.... [A]lthough government may not
place obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need
not remove those not of its own creation. Indigency falls in the latter category. The
financial constraints that restrict an indigent woman's ability to enjoy the full range
of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the product not of governmental
restrictions on access to abortions, but rather of her indigency. Although Congress
has opted to subsidize medically necessary services generally, but not certain
medically necessary abortions, the fact remains that the Hyde Amendment leaves an
indigent woman with at least the same range of choice in deciding whether to obtain
a medically necessary abortion as she would have had if Congress had chosen to
subsidize no health care costs at all. We are thus not persuaded that the Hyde
Amendment impinges on the constitutionally protected freedom of choice
recognized in Wade.
Id. at 316-17. Further, "the Hyde Amendment, by encouraging childbirth except in the most
urgent circumstances, is rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of
protecting potential life." Id. at 325.
See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 694.
Harris,448 U.S. at 312, 316-17.
Id. at 315 (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,474 (1977)).
Id. at 316.
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privacy did not carry sufficient weight to prevent the government "from making
a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and implementing that
judgment by the allocation of public funds." 220
Property rights, however, might carry the necessary weight. The Court's
decision about the validity of the Hyde Amendment fails to comport with other
decisions finding that property rights, and particularly property rights arising out
of poverty, deserve funded protection. In Goldberg v. Kelly, decided a decade
before Harris, the Court "recognize[d] that forces not within the control of the
poor contribute to their poverty."221 As support for this recognition,222 the Court
relied on a law review article by Charles A. Reich that assigned blame for
poverty, at least in part, to the government.223
[T]oday we see poverty as the consequence of large impersonal forces in a
complex industrial society-forces like automation, lack of jobs and changing
technologies that are beyond the control of individuals. It is closer to the truth
to say that the poor are affirmative contributors to today's society, for we are
so organized as virtually to compel this sacrifice by a segment of the
population. Since the enactment of the Social Security Act, we have
recognized that they have a right-not a mere privilege-to a minimal share in
the commonwealth. 224

The Court held that welfare entitlements, by virtue of their property-like
nature, could not be terminated without due process of law. 22 5 Similarly, it has
held "that the interest of an individual in continued receipt of [Social Security
disability] benefits is a statutorily created 'property' interest protected by the
Fifth Amendment." 226 The Court has also described Medicaid benefits as
"protected property interests." 227 While privacy rights at issue in Harris did not
"confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all the
advantages of that freedom [of choice],"228 uterine property rights might do just
that. Using property law could reframe abortion as an entitlement to uterine
property protection, manifested through abortion funding.
The Court's decision in Boddie v. Connecticut is also instructive with
regard to due process rights that must be provided to the poor.229 In Boddie, the
plaintiffs challenged the state requirement that to obtain a divorce, payment of a

220. Id at 314 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,474 (1977)) (internal marks omitted).
221. 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970).
222. Id. at 265 n. 13.
223.

Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74
YALE L. J. 1245, 1255 (1965).

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id.
Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261-64.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982).
Harris, 448 U.S. at 318.
401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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sixty-dollar fee and additional costs associated with service of process be
made. 23 0 The plaintiffs, by virtue of their poverty, could not pay the fees and
costs.23 1The state did not provide a fee waiver, even though judicial proceedings
were the only way to dissolve a marriage.232 In short, the Court held that:
[G]iven the basic position of the marriage relationship in this society's
hierarchy of values and the concomitant state monopolization of the means for
legally dissolving this relationship, due process does prohibit a State from
denying, solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals
who seek judicial dissolution of their marriages.233
Likewise, the government may not deny a woman, solely because of
inability to pay, access to the only legal method of obtaining an abortion,
particularly in light of the centrality of reproduction within this society. Just as
the state created a monopoly over the only means of obtaining a divorce, 234 so
too has the state created a monopoly over the one viable means of obtaining an
abortion. Abortion clinics and individual providers must be licensed by the
state.235 Realistically, an abortion from a licensed provider is--or should be-the
only option. At minimum, it is the only safe option. When the state creates a
single meaningful method of providing a service central to "interests of basic
importance" in society, such as reproduction, then the state may not deny access
to that service solely because of an inability to pay. 236 Accordingly, to comply
with federal due process requirements, if a uterine property doctrine is realized,
then the state would need to maintain a system of providing abortion funding,
and some meaningful process must be associated with the revocation of that
funding. 237
In sum, if women are entitled to protection of uterine property rights, 238 the
state must create and implement a policy239 pursuant to which it generally
provides payment for abortions. Deprivation of that entitlement payment should

230.

Id. at 372.

Id.
Id at 374-76.
Id at 374.
Id. at 375.
See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. § 36-449.02 (2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 390.0111, 390.014
(2011); IND. CODE § 16-21-2-10 (2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12Q (2011).
236. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376-78.
237. It is true that due process is not required when the state has a "countervailing ... interest of
overriding significance" as compared with the right, or deprivation thereof, at issue. Id. at
377. In the abortion context, if the state had such a countervailing interest of overriding
significance, then all abortions would be illegal. It makes little sense that the state's interest
is merely to prevent poor women from obtaining abortions. To be a countervailing interest of
overriding significance, the state's interests in preventing abortions and protecting potential
fetal life should need to be so great that there could be no room for abortions whatsoever.
However, this is known not to be the case.
238. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254; Mathews, 424 U.S. 319; Blum, 457 U.S. 991.
239. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 694.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
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be the outlier, not the rule, and instances of deprivation or other infringement on
that entitlement must be afforded due process.240 Perhaps that process will mean
that the state will not issue payment for women who use abortion as a means of
contraception, rather than condoms, birth control pills, or other available
methods (which, as noted above, are federally funded through Title X24 1). The
Court in Boddie did place some emphasis on the "good faith" of the plaintiffs in
their pursuit of divorces; 242 the same good faith might be required in the abortion
context as well. The details of the due process can be left for another day. The
point for now is that the state should not be permitted, within the context of this
legal scheme, to sit on the sidelines when its policy of refusing to fund abortions
deprives women of their rights to uterine property, and specifically the right to
exclude trespassers from that property.
VI. CONCLUSION

This article has progressed through the thinking exercise of how a proabortion argument based on anti-trespass law and uterine property principles
might be envisioned. Property rights in the uterus could be created without
subjecting women's reproductive organs to market forces. Unwanted fetuses
could be considered trespassers in a woman's uterus. The government could be
responsible for establishing a system of protecting uterine property from fetal
trespassers, which could provide federal funding for abortions. Since fetuses are
not full persons under the Constitution,243 arguably aborting them does not
deprive them of life without due process. Even if they were accorded full
personhood status, deadly force may be used to protect uterine property.
The thinking, however, must not stop there. Is it useful to progress in this
way? Consider some possible positives. First, most simply, it might work. It
might be that reframing Roe as uterine property, complete with the right to
exclude and a governmental system designed to protect that property, could
secure national public funding for abortions. For poor women, the right to
choose is somewhat bare without that funding. In light of recent legislative
efforts to thwart all government dollars that might in any way be spent on
abortions,244 this new property-based abortion discourse might prove to be
particularly useful.
Property-based abortion discourse could also shift the language of the
current debate. The "specter of the evil mother" 245 advanced by the anti-choice
camp does little to create space for meaningful dialogue with women who, for
240.

See Boddie, 401 U.S. 371.

241. See supra, notes 179-180 and accompanying text.
242. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 381-82.
243. See supra notes 203-207 and accompanying text.
244.

245.

See, e.g., Naftali Bendavid, Republicans Push AntiabortionBills, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2011,
at A6; David M. Herszenhorn, As House Passes Big Budget Cuts, Standoff Looms, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2011, at Al.
BORDO, supra note 18, at 81.
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one reason or another, want to choose to end a pregnancy. Likewise, little room
is left for negotiation when the opposing camps focus so much attention on
defining when life begins.246 The fiercely bitter opposition between the pro- and
anti-choice camps may be the most frustrating result of Roe.
Roe ventured too far in the change it ordered. The sweep and detail of the
opinion stimulated the mobilization of a right-to-life movement and an
attendant reaction in Congress and state legislatures. In place of the trend
'toward liberalization of abortion statutes' noted in Roe, legislatures adopted
measures aimed at minimizing the impact of the 1973 rulings, including
notification and consent requirements, prescriptions for the protection of fetal
life, and bans on public expenditures for poor women's abortions. 247
Changing the language of the debate from privacy doctrine to property
doctrine could shift the dynamics. The property principles and application
discussed above simultaneously recognizes a fetus as a "life" and a woman as an
autonomous decision-maker, and then evaluates the juxtaposed interests of those
two parties. Maybe a shift in the legal framework applicable to the abortion
debate can push that debate forward and generate progress. At minimum,
abortion rights and access based on uterine property could change the ways in
which the players most involved in the debate think about the underlying issues.
Conversely, reframing Roe in terms of uterine property rights might carry
some negative consequences. As much as new language might shift thinking, it
does not change the underlying anti-choice sentiment that abortions kill living
things. Thus, consensus may still be elusive. Also, anti-trespass laws are
creations of each state; relying on a state-based system of enforcement rather
than a federal system may create more problems instead of solutions. Along
similar lines, different states have different rules about when deadly force may
be used against trespassers. Further, what is lost by envisioning the fetus as an
intruder? This conception might devalue the lived experiences of women seeking
abortions, who may not feel quite so hostile against the fetuses, but nonetheless
believe they cannot bring a child into the world at the particular point in time of
*
*
248
their pregnancies.
The point of this piece has not been to find the right answer, but rather to
offer a thought exercise focused on a different legal framework for establishing
abortion rights and access. What might happen if a new lens is applied to an old
problem? Where to go from here, with a new basis for discussion in hand, is a
question that activists, advocates, and lawmakers must now address.

246.

See LUKER, supra note 206, at 4-8.

247.

Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 381-82 (internal marks and citations omitted).

248. See Lisa H. Harris, Second Trimester Abortion Provision: Breaking the Silence and
Changing the Discourse, 16 (31 Supp.) REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH MATTERS 74, 79 (2008).
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